Wednesday, May 31, 2006

3 new William B. Greene texts online

I'm nearing the finish line in my work archiving Greene's Socialistic, Communistic, Mutualistic and Financial Fragments. The most recent additions include the Letter To The Rev. H. Foote, Minister Of King's Chapel, which addresses the status of poor working women in the Boston area, and probably reflects the Greenes' involvement with local labor activism and philanthropic activity. (William and Anna, as well as their daughter Elizabeth, were active in various ways addressing "the social problem" in Boston.) Appendices to this essay include Greene's translation of St. Simon's "Parable," which appeared in slightly-altered form in his early currency writings, and as a straight translation in The Word, plus an excerpt from Adolphe Granier de Cassagnac's History of the Working and Burgher Classes, which Greene discussed in the 1850 Mutual Banking. (The translation seems to be Greene's own.)

The Address of the Internationals also appeared in the Fragments, after separate pamphlet publication in 1873. Although this was apparently a work "by divers hands," much of the language and subject matter is very obviously Greene's. Note that this piece was issued after the IWA had largely self-destructed, and certainly after the American individualists had been cast out from among its numbers, so it is, perhaps, less a document of the "First International" than a statement of belief in an unceasing revolutionary struggle. Understood in this way, the connections of the International with the Knights Templar and some of the more bizarre elements of the piece are more understandable. The "Preface" ends with a passage which may be familiar to some readers, as it is from the end of The Blazing Star (1872), where Greene speaks of the Paris Commune, and asserts that Paris is (potentially) a "third holy city."

The other new Greene text in the Labyrinth is The Incarnation. A Letter To Rev. John Fiske, D.D., a theological work from 1848, which follows The Doctrine of the Trinity (1847), and continues some of its arguments. Mutualist readers should look for the bits of autobiography, the continuing attempts to incorporate the work of Pierre Leroux, engagements with the "mediatorial" Christianity of William Ellery Channing and Orestes Brownson (although by this time, Brownson was on a rather different path), etc. As the last few of Greene's writings from the Brookfield period enter the library, it will become easier to connect the theological efforts with the more obviously mutualist writings. But let me repeat something I said with regard to the 1847 text:
Here is a fine example of the the Rev. Mr. Wm. B. Greene, of South Brookfield, the man who wrote Equality and Mutual Banking. He is a much less familiar figure to most of us than Col. Greene, who befriended a young Benjamin R. Tucker and presided over the meetings of the New-England Labor Reform League, but also, in many ways, a more interesting and vital figure.
And let me go further: To the very end, Greene continued to weave the religious, political and economic elements of his writing tightly together. He also never really abandoned the philosophical and historical theories he developed or adopted early on, though he published comparatively little about them, perhaps considering them of little interest to his later allies. We tend to reduce Greene to the role of caretaker for the land bank idea, or chief inspiration to Tucker; but Greene himself seems to have understood his work as rather more ambitious. If we're to understand his ambitions, we need to be able to address his whole body of work.

More pieces of the puzzle are on the way: I'm wrestling with some formatting issues, but Proudhon's Solution to the Social Problem is nearing readiness, as are e-text versions of the texts I used in a short Channing-Brownson-Greene "seminar" my students and I conducted this Spring in my "Great Ideas" class. Those texts will include Brownson's famous essay on "The Laboring Classes," together with the Channing essay to which it was a response and some additional contemporary responses to Brownson. They will also include documents by all three writers addressing "The Mediatorial Life of Jesus" and the "doctrine of life" which Brownson and Greene derived from the work of Leroux. Time to get back to the scanner. . .

Tuesday, May 30, 2006

Joshua King Ingalls, "Economic Equities" (1887)

The holiday weekend was hot as blazes here, so I hid inside quite a bit, and got a lot of work done. The first fruits of that is a pdf of Joshua King Ingalls' Economic Equities (1887). Ingall's major publications were (according to OCLC data):

  • Periodical business crises. New York : Liberator (Co-operative) Print. and Pub. Co., 1878. 12 pages.

  • Work and wealth. Reprinted from "The Radical Review". New York, the Author, 1878(?). 13 pages.

  • ---. Boston, B.R. Tucker, 1881. 13 pages.

  • Work and wealth : an essay on the economics of socialism. London : International Pub. Co., 1881. 12 pages.

  • Henry George examined : should land be nationalized or individualized? New York City : Published by the author, 1882. [reprint from Liberty, ] 16 pages.

  • Social wealth: the sole factors and exact ratios in its acquirement and apportionment. New York : Social Science Pub. Co., 1885. 320 pages.

  • ---. New York, The Truth Seeker Company, 1885. vi, [7]-320 pages.

  • Economic equities : a compend of the natural laws of industrial production and exchange. New York : Truth Seeker Co., 1887. 63 pages.

  • Social industry, or, The sole source of increase. Sioux City, Iowa : Printed for the Author by Fair Play Pub. Co., 1891. 11 pages.

  • The unrevealed religion : an address delivered in Union Hall, Glenora, New York, January, 1891. Sioux City, Iowa : Printed for the author by Fair Play Pub. Co., 1891. 24 pages.

  • Reminiscences of an octogenarian in the fields of industrial and social reform. New York : M.L. Holbrook ; London : L.N. Fowler, 1897. viii, [3]-198 pages.

Ingalls was a land reformer, an associate of George Henry Evans and Lewis Masquerier. He was connected as well with the Union Reform League (along with Stephen Pearl Andrews, Ezra and Angela Heywood, Henry Appleton, Josephine Stone, and others) and with Andrew Jackson Davis through the Univercoelum. He was a contributor to Liberty, Rational Review, Truth Seeker and American Socialist.

A letter from Gerrit Smith to Ingalls in available as part of the Syracuse University Library's "Gerrit Smith Broadside and Pamphlet Collection," which contains a wealth of abolitionist and Liberty Party documents. See also this excerpt from Proceedings of the Freethinkers Convention, Watkins, New York, August 23-25 (1878), at the site.

Thursday, May 25, 2006

John A. Lant, Radical Printer and Journalist

I'm always interested to find radicals from the NW Ohio area. There are no shortage of interesting connections here: Lysander Spooner was involved in land speculation in what became Grand Rapids, OH, just down the road a few miles. Samuel "Golden Rule" Jones was Toledo's "anarchist mayor" (and Pingree, the progressive mayor of Detroit during the 1890's depression, had been a member of William B. Greene's Civil War regiment.) There have been important free thought, free religionist (The Index, to which Greene and Benjamin Tucker contributed) and socialist (W. F. Ries) publications based in Toledo. Henry Demarest Lloyd wrote about Toledo's battles with the oil and gas trusts in the 1880's and 90's, and George H. Phelps wrote his The New Columbia, or, The Re-United States while engaged in a later set of battles against Standard Oil.

Recently, when I started work again on Lewis Masquerier's writings, I found yet another local connection. Masquerier's "Premium remedy for hireling slavery," was printed by John A. Lant, a comrade to whom Masquerier devotes two separate sections in Sociology (1877) and its Appendix (1884). Lant was subject to persecution and prosecution by Anthony Comstock for material in his paper, the Toledo Sun. He also apparently made the original plates of Oahspe, a spiritualist "bible" (about which, see this letter to Banner of Light, 1883). Lant's papers and publications are scarce and scattered, but here are Masquerier's accounts of his life and trials.


Was born in Blairsville, Pa., December, 9, 1842. He absorbed the educational advantages of a small township school, and at thirteen began life in a printing office at Pittsburgh Leaving the case in 1860 he joined the army and served throughout the war as a private soldier. His special acts of heroism and humanity were as marked as was his general disregard of the cockney discipline of the camp. At the second Fredericksburg he responded to a call for volunteers to scale the fortifications, and with three others, led them forward, life in hand, to the top, revealing through the morning light to the commanding officers on the plain below that the enemy had withdrawn to their inner works, when the troops were ordered up and a fierce battle fought and won. Soon after the war he established papers in Sharon, Pa., and Toledo, O. At the latter city he started the land and labor agitation, organizing the Free Land League and other reforms in 1872. The panic on, he rebuked the immorality of officery, church, state and nation, invoking official enmity and wrath. The state Legislature was petitioned to suppress his paper, but partisan bigotry did not prevail; then Federal authority was summoned and he was convicted and fined. His office was seized in his absence by the Sheriff and sold at once. Undaunted he sought to hire his paper printed, but could get no one to do the work. With one compositor he went to an abandoned printing office at Oak Harbor and issued two numbers under great mechanical and pecuniary embarrassment; then to Sandusky, O., where the Kinney Bros., who had just issued a Life of Captain John Brown, made him welcome and gave him the use of their office. There he issued five numbers, when he returned to Toledo, and resumed his publication. He was again harassed and threatened, and a complaint lodged that he was mailing copies of his paper to persons who had not subscribed for it! The Government took this offense in hand, but it was never brought to issue. In the spring of 1876 he removed with his family press and type, to New York, where he threw off copies of his Toledo Sun by thousands. It was refused admission at the post-office, but sold rapidly among the people. Spies were on his track and he was arrested at the instance of one of them by two U. S. marshals, and put into prison. An enormous bail was demanded, which, when furnished, was refused! the U. S. attorney stating "if we admit this man to bail he will go on printing his paper, and that we are not going to permit." On appeal to Judge Blatchford, three weeks later, the bail was accepted and the prisoner released to await the action of the Grand Jury. Meantime he was indicted without notification, and re-arrested on a bench warrant on default of bond, a week before his bond was due! This blunder was but a part of the infamous proceedings. Believing that he was meanly accused and basely misunderstood, two counselors on the day of trial volunteered to defend him, but the judge refused to adjourn the case. No U. S. prisoner at that time had the right to testify in his own behalf, and Lant was obliged to silently submit to the merciless will of his licentious persecutors. He was instantly convicted in the face of numerous petitions from the people, and three weeks later was sentenced to fine and imprisonment in language both malignant and unjust, and wholly unbecoming the lips of an American judge. The court record is silent as to the specific nature of his offense, but the "pardon" which was handed him at the close of his year and a half's imprisonment, reads, "for transmitting unlawful matter through the mails." While a prisoner of war, Lant was subjected by the enemies of his country to less indignity and cruelty than was heaped upon him by the vindictive officials and fanatical bigots who claimed to be its friends. His voice and pen have never been silent as the columns of his Labor and Industrial Liberator attest. For the past few years he has been engaged is the production of reformatory books, and is at present active in the living reforms of the day."

"Appendix to Sociology," p. 29-30.




After the pious imprisonment of Abner Kneeland for saying he could not believe in the orthodox God of the Christians in this country, and after the imprisonment of George Jacob Holyoake by the English Church in England for saying that the people were too poor to support a church, all Freethought men had hoped that such pious persecutions had ceased forever during this century. But the indictment and imprisonment of John A. Lant shows that the demon of religious hatred and vengeance still rankles in the Christian's heart. For merely criticizing the Beecher-Tilton adultery case in common with the rest of the press, and for publishing in his little paper a medical term used in medical works, he has been thus outraged in his liberty of speech and immured in prison at hard labor, leaving a helpless wife and three small children with no means Of support but the charity of friends. The informer, the persecutor, judge and jury have all united in this cowardly and mean proceeding. They charge him with blasphemy, when if there were any such a crime as blasphemy, it must be committed by the Christians themselves for calling one of the persons in their trinity by the vulgar and slang term, of Holy Ghost, and in representing the sublime Power and Intelligence of the Universe as being gibbeted on two cross-beams of wood.

Here, then, right among us, an outrage has been committed such as took place throughout the reign of Christendom, of burying in prison the innocent reformer by those who are really the true felons that ought to have been punished. One portion of the New York press joined in the cry of "wolf," while the other was either ignorant or heedless at the time of this outrage, which is enough to make the earth quake with indignation and spit volcanic fire. It must have been a toadying rump majority in Congress that amended the post-office law and appointed a fanatical Hudibras to execute it.

"Sociology," p. 137.

Monday, May 22, 2006

Calvin Blanchard sounds off! (1861)

In the back pages of his Religio-political physics: or, The science and art of man's deliverance from ignorance-engendered mysticism, and its resulting theo-moral quackery and governmental brigandage (1861, coming soon to the Labyrinth), Calvin Blanchard, libertarian positivist publisher and bookseller, included a short essay, "My Undertaking and its Auspices," which addressed his mission as a publisher and, in a humorous way, suggested that, despite all sorts of apparent resistance to "infidel literature," most people were really on his side. The piece is a nice specimen of Blanchard's prose, and also a nice contrast with the position laid out by Henry Edger in his Modern Times, the Labor Question, and the Family. Blanchard and Edger were to two Comptean positivists most connected in early American libertarian circles.

[Calvin Blanchard]
In 1854, Comte's Positive Philosophy and Feuerbach's Essence of Christianity fell under my observation. Many years before I had read Fourier. His system, by itself, however, seemed to me to lack foundation. But Comte furnished that foundation, and Feuerbach's demonstration of the naturalness of "supernaturalism" precluded the possibility of my coming to any other conclusion in the premises than that the religious idea was the index to, and nature's guaranty for, that Heaven on earth, of which Fourier was the prophet, but which he, unfortunately, attempted to minutely describe at too great a distance, and thus fell into vagaries, with respect to particulars, which did much to obscure, and bring into contempt, his most profound and transcendently brilliant discoveries.

I now determined to do all that lay in my power to forward that human perfection which was no longer a mere vague abstraction, but a mathematically calculable certainty. I soon placed before the American public, "The Positive Philosophy" of Auguste Comte, "The Essence of Christianity," by Ludwig Feuerbach, and Fourier's "Social Destiny of Man."

It is but justice to. Messrs. D. Appleton & Co. to say that before I commenced publishing liberal books, they imported an edition of The Positive Philosophy; a work as much more powerful in the destruction of theology, than anything before written, as Sharp's rifles and artillery are more destructive than pop-guns and bows and arrows.

Also, the Messrs. Harper & Brothers had the honor to precede me in the publication of "Howitt's History of Priestcraft." They also, as I do, publish that silencer of Moses—that most powerful antidote to superstition, priestcraft, and old fogyism, "Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation."

In fact the largest publishers both in France, Germany, England, and the United States are finding it for their interest to publish, not only the most thorough of what are vulgarly called "infidel books," but even those books which recognize the rights of the human passions. To such an extent have passional rights come to be respected, that our more fashionable periodicals increased their circulation immensely by laying before their readers that unanswerable plea for the freedom of the affections, purporting to be a letter from the truly Honorable Mrs. Mary Gurney.

Do the Harpers, the Browns, the Littles, the Bohns, the Appletons, the Longmans, and the numerous other eminent publishers who are putting forth books which are sapping the very foundation of "our holy religion" in a "quiet way," as their Christian (?) apologists term it, sincerely believe what they profess to? When I professed the religion of Christianity (which was only whilst I remained ignorant of the fact that its truth had been understandingly disputed), I was as sincere as I am now that I profess the religion of science, and I most solemnly declare, that I would have suffered martyrdom in its most horrible form, sooner than I would have published Higgins's "Anacalypsis," Comte's "Positive Philosophy," Theodore Parker's works, Buckle's "History of Civilization in England," Hume's "Essays," the "Vestiges of Creation," Howitt's "History of Priestcraft," Humboldt's "Letters to Von Ense," or hundreds of similar works now put forth in "a quiet way," by Christian (?) publishers. I most earnestly entreat the Christian (?) apologists, for the "quiet" method of "damning souls" and demoralizing mankind," to reflect one moment on the character of the scheme which they are apologizing for. Do but this, and whatever may be your conclusions as to religion, you will respect, aye, love me ever afterward for this hint.

The "Essence of Science" I published in 1859, and "The Religion of Science" in 1860. These give a view of the results which a practical application of Comte, Feuerbach and Fourier must produce. They show conclusively, that nature is sufficient; that she spontaneously tends to perfection. And they demonstrate how man can so facilitate the process, that this great aim of nature may be attained with rapid and constantly increasing speed. Up to the present time, so great has been the demand for books liberal not only with respect to opposition to theology and its governmental superstructure, but with respect to the long-crushed rights of the human passions, that my publications are now forty-four in number, of large size on the average, and many of them have, without recourse to auction sales or to the fraudulent and gambling credit system, reached their fifth edition.
The clergy have been most encouraging purchasers of my books, as their preaching attests. Scarcely a discourse do they deliver in which they do not allude to some of them, or their contents, and in a manner exactly calculated to arouse curiosity respecting, and to stir up inquiry for them. The best points in their sermons are suggested by my publications, as all know who have heard the one and read the other. The books which I publish, and similar ones, are now far more consulted by the higher clergy than is the Bible itself. Evidently, they long to be able to preach the religion of science, to expand the infant mind by means of it, instead of cramping it all but to death within the narrow compass of the religion of mystery. As, throughout Nature, the good which is capable of arising from use, is in exact proportion to the evil which arises from abuse, what conceivable good may we not with certainty expect from that now most abominable of abuses, the church?
From the wealthy—from those who are heartily sick of the mockery of the gilding which little more than hides their misery from those who cannot afford whitewash for theirs—who see that the way which I am showing is the only one whereby wealth can be made valuable to any extent worth mentioning, have I also received most substantial support. But I must not mention names. We must "wait a little longer" (and I am encouraged to think not very long) before it will be popularly glorious to reward the toils and strengthen the hands of those who are laboring for the religion of science and its practical liberty and goodness.
Terrified by superstition, and brow-beaten and constrained by old fogyism, their silver-toned voices and sweet lips may filter out No, but their ravishing eyes say Yes. Their inmost heart-aspirations are for the triumph of a religious and social system which will develop them beyond a blemish; thus banishing their jealousies of each other, and rendering them very goddesses at whose feet it will be the highest bliss of man, commensurately developed, to adore. In their inmost hearts, they long for the time when love will be universally reciprocal, and when lovers may, secure from harm and consequent disgrace, spontaneously luxuriate in each other's embraces.
Mankind express their fears that the intelligible perfection which I, an apostle of the religion of science preach, is "too good to be true." They thus naively own that their very hearts' desire is for the triumph of the religion of science and for my success. Is not happiness the wish of all? Can any one object to Heaven on earth? Why believe in a millennium incomprehensibly producible, instead of in one demonstrably practicable?
even do not hate me; they but delude themselves when they think so. Man's own ignorance is the only thing which he really hates. It is his ignorance alone which stands between him and perfect, and sufficiently lasting happiness; ignorance with respect to the modifications and harmonies of which the substantial is precisely as susceptible as that figment of the imagination, the "spiritual," is incoherently fancied to be. There is, there can be, no despotism, no evil, of which the kind of ignorance just named is not the sole cause.
The Religious Press, even, indirectly aids me!
a newspaper unctuous of holiness, in an elaborate general notice of all the books published by me, says that they are "without suppression," and that I have "wit enough to see that honesty is the best policy;" which high eulogium contrasts ludicrously enough with its author's simultaneous feint of reproving me for my course as a publisher

Is it a rare specimen of "honesty," and therefore deserving of special praise, for an American publisher to put forth books of vital importance to mankind "without suppression?" Have either of the editors of "The World" (one of whom I am told is a "Shakspeare Scholar") ever been employed in mutilating European books for the edification of the American public, a public which glories in nothing so much as in being its own best judge in all matters pertaining to religion, government and morals?

The censorship of the press is so odious, that it has to be exercised with great caution and due formality, even in imperial France. Do publishers, in "free" America, dare to erect themselves into the most insufferable of tyrants? And am I the only publisher on whom this Great Democratic Republic can safely rely?" "The World's" praise is either alarmingly significant, or altogether too complimentary. I am well assured that the views of "The World" sub rosâ, both with respect to "the flesh" and "the devil," are "all right," that its whole body editorial inwardly prefers truth to falsehood; and that they would fain displace books which perpetuate mystery, despotism and old fogyism by those which advocate intelligibility; which demonstrate how to achieve actual liberty; which show how abominably the sexual relations have hitherto been fooled with, and how to remedy that and every other evil. But whoever dares not say so in a straightforward manner evidently has not yet, as "The World" says that I have, made the grand discovery that "honesty is the best policy."

"The World" evidently does not discern the signs of the times. It libels the intelligence of the age, and underrates nineteenth century advancement in not daring to approve my course and recommend my publications, without feigning to be doing the contrary.

Does "The World" expect or desire to be believed sincere by those whose opinions it values, and whose judgments it respects, when it affirms that the renowned "Decameron" of Boccaccio,* and the world-famous "Confessions" of Jean Jacques Rousseau, are works of "slender literary merit?" "The Confessions," says Lord Brougham, "is the greatest triumph ever won by diction."

Does "The World" sincerely wish it to be understood that it judges Dryden, Ovid, and Johannes Secundus to be authors of "slender literary merit?"

Nor shall "The World" excuse itself for advertising my publications "gratis," under the pretext of exposing me for attempting to bribe it to puff them. At the risk of appearing ungrateful, even, I assert, upon my honor, that I never, either "anonymously" or "personally," offered, or instigated to be offered, pay to any one for "puffing" or praising my books; that I knew nothing whatever concerning a recent "Puff Gratis," both of myself and my books, until I read it in "The World." When I cannot do business except by such contemptible methods, I will retire, or, at least be consistent enough to publish only such books as are conceived in falsehood, and can best be palmed off through corruption.

I am duly grateful to "The World" for its evident good intentions toward me as a publisher of "Books which are Books," and which are reliable, or "without suppression," and, in return, I will give it a piece of information. Mankind, with the exception of the pitiably unintelligent, are now so sick of mystery, and its superincumbent political, social, and moral inefficiency and abomination, that they simply endure these together with the gammon which hypocritical cowards perpetrate in consequence thereof, because they do not well see how to get rid of them, they patiently suffer these, whilst waiting for the triumph of the intelligible and satisfactory religion of science, and its corresponding governmental or social art. If you have anything useful, or which after duly considering, you deem useful and practical, to offer on religious and social subjects, or, if you wish to direct attention to useful books in relation thereto, and guide the thinking public to where such books are sold, let what you say indicate directly what you mean. All but downright fools will like you the better for it, and, what is of vastly more importance to yourself, or should be, you will thus justly secure your own respect and esteem.

If we really have an inquisition in this country, a power somehow lurking in our social structure—in our "model republic," which overrides its own "free" " Constitution," vetoes Protestantism, and belies all our boasts of liberty, a power before whom reformers, or their friends have cause to quail, and falter and prevaricate, as "The World" seemingly does, measures cannot be too promptly taken to eliminate that abomination, to purge our democratic republic of what, to it, is immeasurably more humiliating and disgraceful than it can be in Spain, or in any country where civilization has not advanced to Protestantism and its correlative, the "elective franchise."

* Such writers as Ben Jonson, Dryden, Moliere, and even Shakspeare, have, surreptitiously, I am sorry to say, taken Boccacio for their model; and Roscoe, and even Milton, seem at a loss for terms strong enough to express their admiration of the genius which conceived "The Decameron."

Sunday, May 21, 2006

Henry Edger, a Positivist Priest at Modern Times

Although the community of Modern Times was organized on Josiah Warren's principles of "equitable commerce" and "individual sovereignty," it was not by any means a community of anarchists. The experimental community drew a wide range of participants, some of whom differed significantly from the project's main propagandists in their ideas about various issues. Among the more interesting and articulate of the dissident participants was Henry Edger, perhaps the first "priest" of Positivism in the US. He published a number of works from Modern Times, and also contributed an essay to Benjamin Tuckers Radical Review. Modern Times, the Labor Question, and the Family: A Brief Statement of Facts and Principles (1855), was published by Calvin Blanchard, another reformer influenced by Comte, but of a more decidedly libertarian stripe. (I posted his Crisis Chapter on Government here last January.)

Check back for more on Edger and his relationship to the individualist anarchists.

Friday, May 19, 2006

Samuel Hartlib on William Potter's Land Bank

In the post Land-Banks as a substitute for Alchemy?! I mentioned a text by Samuel Hartlib, on William Potter's land bank proposal, The Key of Wealth. The 1653 essay,

An essay upon Master W. Potters designe, concerning a bank of lands to be erected throughout this common-wealth: whereby lands may be improved in a new way to become the ground for increase of trading, and of publique and private revenues, and accomodations, represented thus briefly, by a person of singular zeal and integrity to all publike interest,

appeared originally as an appendix to:

A discoverie for division or setting out of land, as to the best form, published by Samuel Hartlib, Esquire, for direction and more advantage and profit of the adventurers and planters in the fens and other waste and undisposed places in England and Ireland ; whereunto are added some other choice secrets or experiments of husbandry, with a philosophical quere concerning the cause of fruitfulness ; and an essay to shew how all lands may be improved in a new way to become the ground of the increase of trading and revenue to this common-wealth

and this text is described as "Imparted in a letter to Samuel Hartlib by Cressy Dymock."

Hartlib, who was among the founders of the Royal Society, appears to be fodder for extensive study on his own, some of it bibliographical. He was vitally interested in questions of "husbandry," which appears in this instance to amount to a concern with what later radicals would call "the land question." Several of Hartlib's books consist of letters from others in his circle, and library citations are full of questions about attribution. One source attributes An Essay upon Master W. Potter's designe to Sir Cheney Culpeper. Potter, Cressy Dymock, and Robert Child all seem to have been part of Hartlib's circle, and all were concerned with the productivity of the land and the prosperity of the people. Robert Markley notes a contribution to a volume titled Samuel Hartlib His Legacy of Husbandry, by Potter, in which he claims that "the capacity of inriching this Nation, is in a sort infinite." It looks like our land bank pioneers also, unsurprisingly, labored in some other interesting directions. [So. . . off go the library requests. More later, including William Potter's works themselves.]

An Essay upon Master W. Potter's designe is now available in pdf form from the Libertarian Labyrinth.

There is an interesting manuscript transcription of the work, from 1732, available for sale online.

Proudhon's "The Malthusians" (Benjamin Tucker translation)

Proudhon published Les Malthusiens in Le Représentant du Peuple (August 10, 1848). It was published separately the following year. We know William B. Greene was reading in it Massachusetts in 1849-50; the section on "Usury" in the 1850 Mutual Banking is full of references. Benjamin Tucker translated the essay for the May 31, 1884 issue of Liberty. The Research on Anarchism site lists an 1886 London publication, "reprinted from The Anarchist." The text here is taken from Libertarian Microfiche Project reprint (PP 957) of the 1938 Ishill Freeman Press edition.

The Malthusians
P.-J. Proudhon

Dr. Malthus, an economist, an Englishman, once wrote the following words:

"A man who is born into a world already occupied, his family unable to support him, and society not requiring his labor, such a man, I say, has not the least legal right to claim any nourishment whatever; he is really one too many on the earth. At the great banquet of Nature there is no plate laid for him. Nature commands him to take himself away, and she will not be slow to put her order into execution."

As a consequence of this great principle, Malthus recommends, with the most terrible threats, every man who has neither labor nor income upon which to live to take himself away, or at any rate to have no more children. A family,—that is, love,—like bread, is forbidden such a man by Malthus.

Dr. Malthus was, while living, a minister of the Holy Gospel, a mild-mannered philanthropist, a good husband, a good father, a good citizen, believing in God us firmly as any man in France. He died (heaven grant him peace) in 1834. It may be said that he was the first, without doubt, to reduce to absurdity all political economy, and state the great revolutionary question, the question between labor and capital. With us, whose faith in Providence still lives, in spite of the century's indifference, it is proverbial—and herein consists the difference between the English and ourselves—that "everybody must live." And our people, in saying this, think themselves as truly Christian, as conservative of good morals and the family, as the late Malthus.

Now, what the people say in France, the economists deny; the lawyers and the litterateurs deny; the Church, which pretends to be Christian, and also Gallican, denies; the press denies;the large proprietors deny; the government which endeavors to represent them, denies.

The press, the government, the Church, literature, economy, wealth,—everything in France has become English; everything is Malthusian. It is in the name of God and his holy providence, in the name of morality, in the name of the sacred interests of the family, that they maintain that there is not room in the country for all the children of the country, and that they warn our women to be less prolific. In France, in spite of the desire of the people, in spite of the national belief, eating and drinking are regarded as privileges, labor a privilege, family a privilege, country a privilege.

M. Antony Thouret said recently that property, without which there is neither country, nor family, nor labor, nor morality, would be irreproachable as soon as it should cease to be a privilege; a clear statement of the fact that, to abolish all the privileges which, so to speak, exclude a portion of the people from the law, from humanity, we must abolish, first of all, the fundamental privilege, and change the constitution of property.

M. A. Thouret, in saying that, agreed with us and with the people. The State, the press, political economy, do not view the matter in that light; they agree in the hope that property, without which, as M. Thouret says, there is no labor, no family, no Republic, may remain what it always has been,—a privilege.

All that has been done, said, and printed today and for the last twenty years, has been done, said, and printed in consequence of the theory of Malthus.

The theory of Malthus is the theory of political murder; of murder from motives of philanthropy and for love of God. There are too many people in the world; that is the first article of faith of all those who, at present, in the name of the people, reign and govern. It is for this reason that they use their best efforts to diminish the population. Those who best acquit themselves of this duty, who practice with piety, courage, and fraternity the maxims of Malthus, are good citizens, religious men, those who protest against such conduct are anarchists, socialists, atheists.

That the Revolution of February was the result of this protest constitutes its inexpiable crime. Consequently, it shall be taught its business, this Revolution which promised that all should live. The original, indelible stain on this Republic is that the people have pronounced it anti-Malthusian. That is why the Republic is so especially obnoxious to those who were, and would become again, the toadies and accomplices of kings—grand eaters of men, as Cato called them. They would make monarchy of your Republic; they would devour its children.

There lies the whole secret of the sufferings, the agitations, and the contradictions of our country.

The economists are the first among us, by an inconceivable blasphemy, to establish as a providential dogma the theory of Malthus. I do not reproach them; neither do I abuse them. On this point the economists act in good faith and from the best intentions in the world. They would like nothing better than to make the human race happy; but they cannot conceive how, without some sort of an organization of homicide, a balance between population and production can exist.

Ask the Academy of Moral Sciences. One of its most honorable members, whose name I will not call,—though he is proud of his opinions, as every honest man should be,—being the prefect of I know not which department, saw fit one day, in a proclamation, to advise those within his province to have thenceforth fewer children by their wives. Great was the scandal among the priests and gossips, who looked upon this academic morality as the morality of swine! The savant of whom I speak was none the less, like all his fellows, a zealous defender of the family and of morality; but, he observed with Malthus, at the banquet of Nature there is not room for all.

M. Thiers, also a member of the Academy of Moral Sciences, lately told the committee on finance that, if he were minister, he would confine himself to courageously and stoically passing through the crisis, devoting himself to the expenses of his budget, enforcing a respect for order, and carefully guarding against every financial innovation, every socialistic idea,—especially such as the right to labor,—as well as every revolutionary expedient. And the whole committee applauded him.

In giving this declaration of the celebrated historian and statesman, I have no desire to accuse his intentions. In the present state of the public mind, I should succeed only in serving the ambition of M. Thiers, if he has any left. What I wish to call attention to is that M. Thiers, in expressing himself in this wise, testified, perhaps unconsciously, to his faith in Malthus.

Mark this well, I pray you. There are two millions, four millions of men who will die of misery and hunger, if some means be not found of giving them work. This is a great misfortune, surely, and we are the first to lament it, the Malthusians tell you; but what is to be done? It is better that four millions of men should die than that privilege should be compromised; it is not the fault of capital, if labor is idle; at the banquet of credit there is not room for all.

They are courageous, they are stoical, these statesmen of the school of Malthus, when it is a matter of sacrificing laborers by the millions. Thou hast killed the poor man, said the prophet Elias to the king of Israel, and then thou hast taken away his inheritance. Occidisti et possedisti. To-day we must reverse the phrase, and say to those who possess and govern: You have the privilege of labor, the privilege of credit, the privilege of property, as M. Thouret says; and it is because you do not wish to be deprived of these privileges, that you shed the blood of the poor like water: Possedisti et occidisti !

And the people, under the pressure of bayonets, are being eaten slowly; they die without a sigh or a murmur; the sacrifice is effected in silence. Courage, laborers! sustain each other: Providence will finally conquer fate. Courage! the condition of your fathers, the soldiers of the republic, at the sieges of Genes and Mayence, was even worse than yours.

M. Leon Faucher, in contending that journals should be forced to furnish securities and in favoring the maintenance of taxes on the press, reasoned also after the manner of Malthus. The serious journal, said he, the journal that deserves consideration and esteem, is that which is established on a capital of from four to five hundred thousand francs. The journalist who has only his pen is like the workman who has only his arms. If he can find no market for his services or get no credit with which to carry on his enterprise, it is a sign that public opinion is against him; he has not the least right to address the country: at the banquet of public life there is not room for all.

Listen to Lacordaire, that light of the Church, that chosen vessel of Catholicism. He will tell you that socialism is antichrist. And why is socialism antichrist? Because socialism is the enemy of Malthus, whereas Catholicism, by a final transformation, has become Malthusian.

The gospel tells us, cries the priest, that there will always be poor people, Pauperes semper habebitis vobsicum, and that property, consequently in so far as it is a privilege and makes poor people, is sacred. Poverty is necessary to the exercise of evangelical charity; at the banquet of this world here below there cannot be room for all.

He feigns ignorance, the infidel, of the fact that poverty, in Biblical language, signified every sort of affliction and pain, not hard times and the condition of the proletaire. And how could he who went up and down Judea crying, Woe to the rich! be understood differently? In the thought of Jesus Christ, woe to the rich means woe to the Malthusians.

If Christ were living today, he would say to Lacordaire and his companions: "You are of the race of those who, in all ages, have shed the blood of the just, from Abel unto Zacharias. Your law is not my law; your God is not my God!" ° ° ° And the Lacordaires would crucify Christ as a seditious person and an atheist

Almost the whole of journalism is infected with the same ideas. Let "Le National,'' for example, tell us whether it has not always believed, whether it does not still believe, that pauperism is a permanent element of civilization; that the enslavement of one portion of humanity is necessary to the glory of another; that those who maintain the contrary are dangerous dreamers who deserve to be shot; that such is the basis of the State. For, if this be not the secret thought of "Le National," if "Le National" sincerely and resolutely desires the emancipation of laborers, why these anathemas against, why this anger with, the genuine socialists—those who, for ten and twenty years, have demanded this emancipation?

Further, let the Bohemian of literature, today the myrmidons of Journalism, paid slanderers, courtiers of the privileged classes, eulogists of all the vices, parasites living upon other parasites, who prate so much of God only to dissemble their materialism, of the family only to conceal their adulteries, and whom we shall see, out of disgust for marriage, caressing monkeys when Malthusian women fail,—let these, I say, publish their economic creed, in order that the people may know them.

Faites des filles, nous les aimons,—beget girls, we love them,—sing these wretches, parodying the poet. But abstain from begetting boys; at the banquet of sensualism there is not room for all.

The government was inspired by Malthus when, having a hundred thousand laborers at its disposal, to whom it gave gratuitous support, it refused to employ them at useful labor, and when, after the civil war, it asked that a law be passed for their transportation. With the expenses of the pretended national workshops, with the costs of war, lawsuits, imprisonment, and transportation, it might have given the insurgents six months income, and thus changed our whole economic system. But labor is a monopoly; the government does not wish revolutionary industry to compete with privileged industry; at the workbench of the nation there is not room for all.

Large industrial establishments ruin small ones; that is the law of capital, that is Malthus.

Wholesale trade gradually swallows the retail; again Malthus

Large estates encroach upon and consolidate the smallest possessions: still Malthus.

Soon one half of the people will say to the other:

The earth and its products are my property.
Industry and its products are my property.
Commerce and transportation are my property.
The State is my property.

You who possess nether reserve nor property, who hold no public offices and whose labor is useless to us, TAKE YOURSELVES AWAY! You have really no business on the earth; beneath the sunshine of the Republic there is not room for all.

Who will tell me that the right to labor and to live is not the whole of the Revolution?

Who will tell me that the principle of Malthus is not the whole of the counter-Revolution?

And it is for having published such things as these,—for having exposed the evil boldly and sought the remedy in good faith, that speech has been forbidden me by the government, the government that represents the Revolution!

That is why I have been deluged with the slanders, treacheries, cowardice, hypocrisy, outrages, desertions, and failings of all those who hate or love the people! That is why I have been given over; for a whole month, to the mercy of the jackals of the press and the screech-owls of the platform! Never was a man, either in the past or in the present, the object of so much execration as I have become, for the simple reason that I wage war upon cannibals.

To slander one who could not reply was to shoot a prisoner. Malthusian carnivora, I discover you there! Go on, then; we have more than one account to settle yet. And, if calumny is not sufficient for you, use iron and lead. You may kill me; no one can avoid his fate, and I am at your discretion. But you shall not conquer me; you shall never persuade the people, while I live and hold a pen, that, with the exception of yourselves, there is one too many on the earth. I swear it before the people and in the name of the Republic!

Wednesday, May 17, 2006

Google Books for mutualists

The difficulties associated with using Google Books haven't changed much, but the depth of the "full view" library certainly has. I had posted a few titles to the mutualists list recently, but when I looked again, several of Andrews' phonographic texts had been added. Here's a partial list of titles that might be of interest to mutualists and students of the radical traditions:

Andrews, Stephen Pearl:
  • Basic Outline of Universology (1872)
  • Complete Phonographic Class-Book (1845)
  • Complete Phonographic Class-Book (1846)
  • Complete Phonographic Class-Book (1851)
  • Phonographic Reader (1846)
  • Phonographic Word Book Number One (1849)
  • Phonographic Word Book Number Two (1849)
  • Primary Phonotypic Reader (1847)
  • Primary Synopsis of Universology and Alwato (1871)
Ballou, Adin:
  • Autobiography of Adin Ballou, 1803-1890 (1896)
  • Christian Non-resistance (1846)
Bellamy, Edward:
  • Blind Man's World and Other Stories (1898)
  • Dr. Heidenhoff's Process (1880)
  • Equality (1913)
Brownson, Orestes: New Views of Christianity, Society, and the Church (1836)
De Cleyre, Voltairine: Selected Works of Voltairine de Cleyre (1914)
D’Olivet, Fabre: Hebraic Tongue Restored (1921 edition)
Etlzer, John A.: The Paradise Within the Reach of All Men
Goldman, Emma:
  • Marriage and Love (1911)
  • Social Significance of the Modern Drama (1914)
  • Anarchism and Other Essays (1910)
Hall, Bolton:

  • Equitable Taxation (1892)
  • Things as they Are (1909)
  • Even as You and I (1900)
  • Life, and Love and Peace (1909)
Hodgskin, Thomas: Popular Political Economy (1827)
Kraitsir, Charles:

  • Glossology (1854)
  • Significance of the Alphabet (1846)
Leroux, Pierre:

  • De la ploutocratie: ou, Du gouvernement des riches (1848)
  • Réfutation de l'éclectisme (1839)
  • Réfutation de l'éclectisme (1841)
Masquerier, Lewis: Sociology
Proudhon, P.-J.:

  • Amour et Marriage (1876)
  • La Revolution Sociale Demonstree par le Coup D’Etat/Droit au Travail et le Droit
    de Propriete/L’impot sur le Revenu (Oeuvres Complete, 1867)
  • La révolution sociale démontrée par le coup d'état du 2 décembre (1852, 4th)
  • De la capacité politique des classes ouvrières (1865)
  • Les confessions d'un révolutionnaire (1851, 3rd)
  • La pornocratie, ou Les femmes dans les temps modernes (1875)
  • Des réformes à opérer dans l'exploitation des chemins de fer (1855)
  • Système des contradictions économiques (1846)
  • De la capacité politique des classes ouvrières (1865)
  • De la justice dans la révolution et dans l'église (1858)
  • La guerre et la paix (1861, apparently in-process)
Saint-Simon, Henri: Nouveau christianisme (1832)
Spooner, Lysander: An Essay on Trial by Jury
Swift, Morrison: Imperialism and Liberty (1899)
Warren, Josiah:

  • True Civilization: A Subject of Vital and Serious Interest to All People (1869)
  • Equitable Commerce (1849)

Monday, May 15, 2006

Bolton Hall - Snap, the Philosopher Dog

Three Fables from Things as They Are (1899), by Bolton Hall

Philosopher Dog.

I SUPPOSE I must have been half asleep when I heard Snap whine, "Yeow arn yow ell." It sounded like, "You aren't very well. " Strange! I listened again. However, I am fond of Snap, and sometimes talk to him. So I said: "No, I'm not well. Monopole is after the rent of the farm, and I haven't got the money."
"Rent?" said Snap, quite distinctly. "What's rent?"
"Why," said I, "it's what we pay to be allowed to live on any part of the earth that's good for anything. "
"Oh!" said Snap, "you know I caught a rabbit yesterday. He was so fat he could hardly run, so I know all the rabbits will be fat. You aren't as plump as Mr. Monopole."
"No," said I. "You see Monopole's my land lord. I pay him for letting me work this farm."
"Why do you do that?"
"Well," I said, "it's hard to make it clear to an unreasoning mind; but, you see, the King of England granted—that is, eh, —the Indians long ago—er—the people o—I mean that generations past agreed—Oh, say, you couldn't understand that you're a dumb animal."
"Dumb animal!" said Snap, indignantly. " It's you that's dumb. I have yelled at you every night for six years, an you have never even answered me till now. "
"I thought you were baying at the moon," said I, politely.
"Baying! Stuff! Dogs don't bay at the moon. The light keeps me awake, so that I feel the rheumatism, and I yell at you to get me a warm bed. Don't men keep yelling when they are uncomfortable?"
"Well, no," I said. "They mostly say: it's due to hard times, and that there's no good grumbling."
"What did you say dogs are?" said Snap. "Manimals, was it?"
"No, dumb animals," I said.
"I heard you barking at night one November. Were you baying at the moon?"
"No, you stupid beast. I was shouting for Sound Money and Protection."
"Did you get the Sound Money?"
"Oh, yes, we got it all right."
"Then," says Snap, "why don't you pay your rent with it?"
"Well, I didn't exactly get it myself; but the country did."
"And do you own some of the country?"
"N-o, but we all get the Protection."
"What's that?"
"Why," I said, "I will try to be simple. It's a way of keeping people from eating or wearing English things."
"Are English things poison, that you keep people from eating them?"
"Oh, no, they are just as good as ours; but they cost less."
"Then you certainly are rather simple not to use them. Willie has a guinea pig shut up in that little pen in the front yard, so that it can't get at the English clover. Is that Protection?"
"No, that's restriction," I said.
"But if the clover were shut out from the guinea pig, instead of the guinea pig shut in from the clover, would that be Protection?"
"It seems—but we were talking about the landlord," I answered.
"Is Willie the guinea pig's landlord, then?"
"Something like that, " I said, although I had never thought of it before.
"Would the guinea pig stay there if it were as big and wise as you?"
"No, of course not."
"Then is Mr. Monopole bigger and wiser than you?"
"Oh bother! Don't you know old Monopole yourself?"
"If he's no wiser than you, I'm sorry for him," said Snap. "Is"—
"Say, Maria, this dog won't let me rest. I wish you'd put him in the barn."
As Snap was pulled out, I heard him yell out angrily: "Barking at the moon, indeed! Why, the moon is two hundred and forty thousand miles off; but it's not as much off as the master."
Snap thinks too much. Such dogs are dangerous.

A License to Live.

"SAY, Master Renter," said Snap the first time he got me alone, "isn't that rent you told me about like the dog license?"
"Why, yes, in some ways. How do you mean?" I asked.
"I heard the collector tell you that fifty cents had to be paid for me to live."
"Yes," I answered. "He said that was because dogs kill sheep and go mad."
"Would you kill sheep and go mad, if you didn't pay rent?"
"Maybe," said I. "I suppose I'd be an anarchist." Then, to turn the subject, I added, "But, if I didn't pay fifty cents for you, you'd be shot."
"Then Mr. Monopole will shoot you if you don't pay rent? "
"Why, no," I answered, " he won't shoot me, but he might as well: he will put me off the farm. Then I'll be a tramp."
"Do they shoot tramps?"
"No," I said, "they only shoot strikers so far; but they put tramps in jail."
"Mr. Monopole couldn't put you anywhere: he's too weak and fat. Besides, I'd bite him."
"You're a good dog," I said. "Monopole certainly couldn't put me off alone; but all the people in the country would help a land lord, if necessary, to get his rights,—that is, to get his lan—I mean to say, to put me off."
"Then all the people in the country are land lords except you?" asked Snap.
"Dear, no," I said. "Only about one in every eight owns any land; and, even of those, the most, instead of paying rent to a land lord, pay interest to a mortgagee."
"Then -why would they help?"
"Because they, or, rather, the masters of their ancestors, made the law that way."
"I don't see that that's any reason," said Snap, "but I have an unreasoning mind. What's interest?"
"Interest," I said, "is what we pay for the use of bills that we get from the bank."
"Why don't you make them yourself?"
"Because the law allows only people who have fifty thousand dollars to issue money."
"Who made that law?" asked the dog.
"Why, we did," I said. I knew he was going to ask why. So I added, "You know, 'To him that hath shall be given.'"
"Do you think, then," said Snap, "you'll be given any brains?"
"It isn't my fault," I said desperately. "I'm only one of those that made the law that way."
Said Snap: "If I were you, I'd rather be shot like a striker than help in such laws. What is a striker, anyway?"
"A striker," I told him, "is a man who won't work for the wages he can get. "
Snap scratched his head with his hind leg. "Do people get paid for working?" he asked. "I thought you said that you paid Mr. Monopole for being allowed to work."
That's just like a dog. Dogs and women shouldn't be allowed to talk, when they can't vote; and you can't make them understand our political economy.

Is Thy Tenant a Dog?

"WHAT'S wages?" asked Snap.
"Wages are—They are some of the wealth a workingman makes, which he gets for making it."
"What is wealth?"
"Wealth, of course, " I said, "is anything which people want, produced from land by work."
"Oh! But I thought it was you workingmen who made all things. Why don't you keep them all?"
"Because workingmen are like draft animals: they don't appreciate their power, and they don't unite. They distrust one another."
"I wouldn't do that. But, then, I'm only a stupid beast. What are you?"
"I'm—I'm—looking out for myself," I said.
"When I caught the rabbit, you gave me the skin and bones. Was that my wages?"
"I suppose so."
"If I'd caught him on your land, I'd have owed you another rabbit for rent, wouldn't I?"
"Yes, but you got him on Monopole's land. He owns all the land here. He would charge you rent, only he doesn't know you catch rabbits. "
"If the crop of rabbits failed so I couldn't catch two a day, then how could I pay?"
"I guess you'd have to dig potatoes at night with your paws: like me at the harvest time," I added bitterly.
"Why, then," says Snap, "the rent gives employment and diversified industries."
"Yes, like the tariff, " I said. "But, then, it accumulates capital."
"What's capital?" asked the dog.
Said I: "Capital is that part of wealth used to produce more wealth. When I gave you your breakfast, which enabled you to run all day after the rabbit, that was an advance of capital."
"I see," says Snap. "Then, if you'd charged me interest, you would have kept the bones, and I'd have had to starve on the skin.
"I'd have to feed you anyhow, because I own you."
"Does old Monopole have to feed you?"
"No," I said, "of course not."
"Then hadn't you better get old Monopole to own you?"
"Nonsense!" I said angrily. "This is a free country."
"Why," says Snap, hotly, "you told me Monopole owned it."
"Yes," I answered. "But the men are fr—that is, men can't own a man in the United States."
" What's a man?"
"A man is a reasonable animal."
Snap rolled over laughing, and laughed himself into a fit. I don't know what he was laughing at, but I don't like dogs with fits.

Bolton Hall, "The Deliverance from Bondage"

It's been almost a year since I put together the bibliography of Bolton Hall's book-length works, and now I'm finally getting the first of them online. Hall was a libertarian single-taxer and Tolstoyan, founder of Free Acres, and a prime mover in the "enclave" movement within Georgeism. (Just in case you missed it the first time, don't miss: Bolton Hall, single tax anarchist - the song!) I'll be posting a couple of teasers from Things as They Are (1st ed., 1899), the volume I'm currently editing for the Labyrinth. Like a number of Hall's works, the volume is split between essays and parables or "fables." "The Deliverance from Bondage" is a nice specimen of the first. I'll post three fables, featuring Snap, the philosopher dog, a bit later.

Suffering a part of our school course.—Not to be relieved by force.—The divine end and means and method.—Development hindered by outside interference.—Compelling children to be "good."—Experience of ill teaches self-restraint.—The charity palliative of suffering, ineffectual and injurious.—Leave charity to the uninitiated.—Its selfishness and stupidity.—The temperance palliative.—The advance in humanity.—Abandonment of restrictions.—The process.—The growing desire for justice; that is, for love.—Trust to the natural growth.

"No man is wise enough or good enough to govern another;" yet, the wronger and more narrow-minded men are, the more determined they are to force others to walk in their ways.

As we become more enlightened, we cease to despise or hate those who do not like, nor even see, what we admire. "A liberal education" is one which makes us liberal; that is, free as to our minds.

Perhaps, when we become as wise as gods, we shall cease to make laws at all, and leave, as God does, every one to the natural and inevitable consequences of his own deeds.

Suffering teaches the sufferer the effects of actions: our efforts to relieve it teach us the causes of the suffering.

To one who understands that suffering is not an accident, but a consequence, the Call is to show the sufferers its origin and to teach them to avoid that, whether caused by themselves or by others. They must suffer and suffer, in spite of, and even because of, all we can do, until they and we learn the causes of suffering. When they and we learn its causes, and set ourselves to removing them, the suffering becomes tolerable to them and to us.

We may think, perhaps, that persons have no right to bring into the world children for whom they cannot provide. To refrain from so doing, may cause greater evils; but, if we think that is a cause of misery, let us tell the people so. We shall get good thereby. If that really be a cause, and you and I merely relieve the unfortunate children, unless we make the people understand, there will be still more destitute children in the next generation. But, having shown the cause of pain, the proper method is, not to alleviate the pain, but to let the wrong-doers feel it, till they are desirous of removing its cause. Then help them. If, after they have recognised the cause, they still wish to retain it, let them retain it. By no means try to alleviate the pain by making laws restraining them by force from the full gratification of their desires

It has not been fouid by experience that force has prevented wrong. In England, when they hung for sheep-stealing, sheepstealing kept increasing. The reverse was the case when they ceased. In many cases force increases the evil.

Says Mr. William Alexander Smith: "The 'evil' I see in prize fighting is that prize fighters, like prostitutes and saloon keepers, are the perpetual victims of uniformed blackmailers. As in trade and commerce, there should be absolutely free competition in prize fighting, and that class of sport would become a 'drug on the market.' We would have Corbett and Fitzsimnmons contesting for the championship for the pennies we would toss to them, as we do to the hurdygurdy artists."

Comstock, Gerry & Company should be urged to carry out what they believe in every detail. They will soon find that they cannot correct things by force. Indirectly, undoubtedly, they do great good by showing their inability to do the good they had in mind, which is a false good, a sham, or to do any good directly. If they succeeded, it would only be in making hypocrites and weaklings. They say, in effect, "Poor God, with no one to help him rule the world." They have not yet learned, with Æschylus, that "the gods, for what they care for, care enough."

If it is true that men learn by suffering for errors, as much as by rejoicing in success, then laws intended to discourage improvident or illegitimate births, or otherwise to compel goodness, are little better than devices to prevent experience,—plans to keep a certain number of spirits from getting the education which they need. Were we to let people alone, whether drunk or sober, until they interfere with the liberty of another, and to leave drunkenness and the sale of liquor entirely unrestricted, the intemperate would soon drink themselves to death, and thereby cease to propagate their like. This seems harsh. But would it involve more misery than is implied in endless generations of the weak and imbecile half-restrained victims of excess that are kept by force from learning that error is destruction? "But, if we removed the restrictions which make liquor so dear, your poor boy would kill himself with drink"? Why should he not kill himself? My sorrowful sister, is it not better so than that, perhaps, crowds of your descendants through him, should fill the brothels and the jails?

When we see a person spending his money foolishly, getting drunk, or conducting himself in other ways that we think wrong, we are inclined to stop him. We say, "If I were you, or if I were in your place, I would not do so." But, if we had the same knowledge and desires as he, we would do the same. He is spending his money in the way which pleases him. If he were not allowed to do so, he would feel unsatisfied, and would think that .satisfaction would come only when he would be allowed to gratify his appetites. If he so believes, he can never find out that it is not true, until he tries it.

In the same way we ourselves have done something which has resulted badly. We did what we at that time thought would be for our welfare. We did what we wished to do. If we regret it, we are wasting our sentiment; for we knew no better then. Now we know better, and would not repeat that course.

"Why did I do that? I ought to have done otherwise." You are simply putting yourself, with your present experience, in the place of the person who has not yet gotten it. You are like a child who should blame himself because he could not recite his lesson before he had read it in the school-book. Although you made your free choice, as your mind inclined, you did not then know enough to refrain: you know now.

If you call yourself a fool, it shows only that you are still nuch of a fool. We should not, then, subject others to restraint from without, for their own benefit or for the benefit of others whom we think we shall thereby relieve; for that is simply to interrupt the lesson.

It is equally injurious to relieve a man of the consequences of his folly, unless they have already made him wise. Ross Winans said, "I have picked up a great many lame ducks in the course of my life, but all of them were lamer when I put them down, than when I took them up." If a man came to me with the gout, do you think I would heal him? Not at all. I would show him that he ate too much and worked too little, and that, as long as he lives that way, he "has a right" to have the gout. This is not a recipe, but a principle, and applies to all the relations of men and women and children, though, because children are helpless, we hardly yet admit that they have any rights. But they have.

When you see a furious man beating his horse, you do not inquire whether the horse was naughty or not. You say, "That is brutal, " and threaten to report him for cruelty to animals. Your children, however, are beaten at home by angry parents; and it is not reported. Nobody calls it "assault and battery." No. You and I tell the children, "whose angels do always behold the face of their Father which is in heaven," that they are wicked, and that God will punish them. Then, lest God should make some mistake, we punish them ourselves.

Consider what an arrogation of divine wisdom and denial of divine justice it is to punish any one. Not even nature attempts to graduate the suffering to fit the crime. A11 that she decrees is that the appropriate consequence shall follow every violation of law. And this penalty, and the violation, too, is part of the necessary education of the sufferer and of others. Besides, it is a part of law, and happens in accordance with law,—law of which we see or understand little or nothing, but which exists nevertheless.

This is as one should expect. If there is an order in nature, then we may be sure that whatever we do contrary to that order will work wrong and cause suffering, both for ourselves and others. To deny this, to say that the evil tree will bring forth good fruit, is an infidelity no less in the eyes of the scientist than in those of the devout. "I knew," says Ruskin, "that the fool had said in his heart, 'there is no God;' but to hear him declare openly with his lips, 'There is a foolish god,' was something for which my art studies had not prepared me."

The "divine right" of parents to rule is as ridiculous as the "divine right" of kings, and much more injurious. The Declaration of our Independence says that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." Have your children consented that you should be their policeman, judge, and jailer every time you get into a bad temper? Truly, "ignorance, neglect, and contempt of human rights" are responsible for as much of the miseries of childhood as of society.

"But it is necessary to punish children," you say. Necessary, but not right That is equivalent to saying either that there is no God or that his law will not work. You are not God yourself, and to punish is to assume more than divine wisdom; for there are no punishments in the divine order of nature, only inevitable consequences. Remember that scarcely omniscience could measure out punishment suited exactly to the offence. Harmony, consequence, law, —that is the message of the Infinite; and when you secrete the candy-box, lest the child should over-indulge, you deprive him of his birthright of opportunity for selfrestraint. I daily see a child who will play with candy all day long and never touch a bit, except under her mother's advice. She says, "It would not be good for me. " She has learned that faith that is justified by its works.

The nature of things is a school in which one learns to rule his own spirit, to control himself. Then are we to counteract the discipline of the school?

Of course, it takes more time and trouble to teach children than it does to whack them; but have you anything better worth the time and trouble—except to go to afternoon teas? If you must beat your little ones, beat them with a club. That will not destroy their self-respect

Love, patience, experience,—these, and not slippers, are the divine means of teaching; for bruising can teach a child nothing but that you are a bruiser, which he would learn soon enough without your pains. But your bruising does lead a child to think that, if you are not there to punish wrong-doing, it will go unpunished, and that whatsoever the child soweth, that shall he not also reap, but something else,—the only real infidelity.

But, my lazy, dear friend, the world is so made that it really pays to work towards righteousness. "Godliness is profitable for all things," such is the goodness and the severity of eternal law; and you will be surprised to find how even the young barbarian, whon, you have brought forth and developed, will respond to kindness. He is not really worse than the boys at the Elmira Reformatory or than Dr. Arnold's Rugby boys. If the appeal to reason and righteousness succeeds with them, it might with your little child; and, if you must treat him as a mere animal, it is because you have brought him up as a mere brute, and not as a reasonable soul. Experience is a severe teacher, but there is no other for him or for us. The most we can do is to repeat, explain, and illustrate her lessons. To constantly stand in her way is the only "sparing of the rod" that can really spoil the child.

A baby sat next its father at breakfast as soon as it was able to sit up, and was consumed with a desire to reach the silver kettle of hot water. The father carefully explained by signs that it would burn.

Nevertheless, baby sensibly concluded to try for itself. All right.—It did burn. Papa was wiser than baby thought, and could safely be trusted again. Also baby could be trusted near the kettle. If the child had trusted without trying, it would have been a little fool; and, if the father had forced it to, he would have been a big one.

If the child has eaten enough, make him understand that; and, if he will then eat more, let him have indigestion, and let him understand the cause and the consequent discomfort. "But most of the discomfort and care will fall upon me," you say. True; thank goodness for that. We can somewhat bear one another's burdens. Besides, thereby you may get some of the education yourself.

Your little boy sees you take out a knife, curious, shining, and cut a stick in two. He feels the faculty in himself also to work such miracles as that, if he only had the knife. But you tell him not to touch it.

Being wiser than you, he does touch it. If no evil happens, you are convicted of error. If he cuts his fingers, does not that hurt? Then why do you box his ears? It only makes him think you are stupid or revengeful (he is only a child). Better far to let him try, explain to him its dangers, protect him in the trial, and, as soon as he has learned them, let him have a knife.

Thereby you have fulfilled the highest mission of man. What is the good of you and of me except to show the right and warn against the wrong? To the extent that we do those things, we are the prophets of the Lord. "There is one God, and every man is his prophet," joyously, if willingly: otherwise, with pain.

A girl whose education has been by experience will not, like nearly all young girls, run out in the wet with thin shoes, merely because mamma is not there to say no; nor will she clandestinely marry a good-looking "count."

Let your children and your fellows know the truth, and they will trust to it and you. Appeal always to the divinity in men, and not to the beast. If something necessarily disagreeable must be done (there are few such things), explain the reasons, if you see any. I,et the pupil know just how much in it may have to undergo, and accustom it to "do what is wise." If it sometimes refuses to do it, the mischief is less than to run the risk of "breaking its will." It were as well to break a child's back as break its will Where deadly peril threatens, do for your child what you ought to do for your neighbour. You have no right to do more or less. If you see a man ignorantly run in front of the cars, you pull him back. If he but goes out in the rain, you only warn him. So you may do with your child.

You may advise with your superior intelligence: you must not substitute your mind for another's. You may guide by your greater knowledge, but you cannot improve nature with a club. Above all things, do not condemn: "Judge not, that ye be not judged, " for your judgment will probably be wrong.

So that force, even with children, does little good and much harm, as might be expected. "By no process can coercion be made equitable. The freest form of government is only the least objectionable form. The rule of the many by the few, we call tyranny. The rule of the few by the many is tyranny also, only of the less intense kind." (Herbert Spencer, in Social Statics.)

Still less can be hoped from the "power of money," even if wisely spent,—for instance, in charity.

Charity attracts to the cities a large number who, if left in the country, would support themselves somehow. They come to the city, assured that, if they find nothing to do, there are at least plenty of places where they can get shelter. After the panic of 1873 the citizens' relief committee appointed ex-Mayor Hewitt, Reverend Dr. John Hall, and other gentlemen trusted by the public, to see what should be done to relieve the distress of the city. After a full investigation, they decided that the best thing to do was to leave the matter alone, because special efforts would create as much distress as they relieved by attracting into the city those who might make out a living in the country.

We have made no progress in the relief of poverty for eighteen hundred years: we have not fewer paupers, we have not less distress.

Robert Treat Paine says:—

"In spite of all we do, the great fact stares us in the face, that pauperism is steadily gaining ground. More paupers each year, more money wanted, larger almshouses building or to be built."

Nor do most of our efforts even tend to lessen distress or pauperism. Model tenement houses increase the crowding about them, because, holding fewer tenants than the buildings they supplant, they take up as much room; and, in addition, their superior character increases the land value and raises rents, by attracting more inhabitants to the district. Free or subsidised cheap feeding interferes with small restaurants and caterers, and does not in the long run furnish as economical or as good a food supply. But, worse than all this, where there are two men competing for one job, the man who will work the cheapest will get the job, and the man who can live the cheapest will work the cheapest, so that the more you supply charitable "aid of wages," whether by housing, feeding, clothing, or even amusing the workman, the more you reduce his wages. That this factor is indirect makes it none the less powerful. We do the same thing directly and consciously in our charitable institutions by making garments at prices with which the independent worker cannot possibly compete and live in decency, the loss coming out of the pockets of "all such as are religiously and devoutly disposed." It is sad, but undeniable, that our charities are nearly all destroyers of unselfishness by the paid or perfunctory performance of what ought to be done directly from love, and are besides actual factories of paupers.

"Whatever exception you may have encountered, you know that the rule is that those who receive relief are, or soon become, iclle, intemperate, untruthful, vicious, or at least quite shiftless and improvident. You know that the more relief they have, as a rule, the more they need. You know that it is destructive to energy and industry, and that the taint passes from generation to generation, and that a pauper family is more hopeless to reform than a criminal family." (Mrs. Josephine Shaw Lowell, in Outdoor Relief.)

We are told to help the poor to help themselves. The help they really need is help to get rid of us and of our charities, which are devices for keeping us astride of their necks.

Many will not assent to this. Many who do assent will not see clearly, nor act logically if they do see. They also are compassionate. Let them support the charities.

"Let the dead bury their dead." Let those who are dead to the real knowledge of social needs hack at the branches of evil, for they know no better. Nay, by stinted means, compel them to apply themselves to find the most efficacious methods of relief and to seek the roots of misery and destitution. If you yourself do not know what is the matter, or are too lazy to think, why, then, give to the charities. On a business basis, charity is an excellent investment for the rich. All charities are excellent investments; they are so recommended, even from the pulpit. They make taxes high, but we get it all back out of our pay-rolls. They are very cheap and, ethically, utterly worthless.

"System" takes all the good, moral and material, out of charity. Let us feel the evil, see the difficulties, know the poor, and try to raise them, because they are our friends and our brothers. So we shall give and get love, that which alone makes life endurable or heaven desirable.

Temperance appeals more to reason, and not less to sympathy; yet the efforts of temperance reformers are among the chief causes that the present condition of things is tolerated at all. They have impressed upon the public the evils of drink, so that the morally, mentally, or physically lazy soothe themselves with the idea that intemperance is the chief cause of pauperism. It is not the chief cause: it is the chief effect. (See fable, "Incorruptible Inheritance," p 244 )

So much for those tvho think that the gift of God, which is moral elevation, can be bought with silver or gold.

It is hopeless to make men good by law. All that can be done is to give them freedom, and let them work out their own salvation. To this the world tends.

Notwithstanding the Armenian massacres, the persecution of the Doukhobortsis, the subjection of Finland, the Dreyfus case, the massacres in Italy, the Filipino freebooting expedition, and the Coeur d'Alene "bull pen," we have no reason to think that there ever was in the world so much freedom as to-day.

We hear much about Greek liberty and intelligence lost to mankind; but this compares the most advanced aristocrat of one age, the Greek citizen, with the mass of men of our own age. It would have been more absurd to refer questions of art to "the people of Greece," including the vast majority who were "helots," upon whose labours the few lived, than it would be to refer them to our own ignorant helots, who have at least intelligence enough to make comparisons. Of course, the dominant class got whatever it wanted then, just as our dominant classes get what they want now, and will continue to get it until our helots learn to care for one another's interests.

In the times of Greek "liberty " only a few of the "people" of Greece got any of it; while, in most of the world, the idea of freedom had not yet dawned.

We read of the independence of the Pilgrim Fathers, who owned slaves and denied even votes to women. It has only just dawned on the world that slavery, chattel, economic, or sexual, for any being, is wrong.

We hear a great deal about the increasing drift toward State regulation of industry. This supposed tendency is a trouble to Mr. Herbert Spencer. Investigation will show, however, that in reality no such drift exists: the current seems rather to be setting the other way. What looks like such a tendency in legislation is simply an attempt to meet new conditions by a partial application of old specifics. It is not necessary to examine our own legislation in detail, as a few words on Spencer's essays on The New Toryism and The Coming Slavery will illustrate the point. Spencer refers with grief to fifteen English acts passed from 1860 to 1864, being two extensions of the Factories Act to include certain trades, acts regulating prices of gas, truancy, two for vaccination, hire of public conveyances, drainage, employment of women in coal mines, authorised pharmacopoeia, two for local improvement in bake-houses, and inspection of food. These are fair types of "socialistic" legislation everywhere.

All these, except those for the hire of conveyances, employment of women, for coal mines, bake-houses, and inspection of food, are applicable to conditions which were not dreamed of a hundred years ago; and even these five appear to have been intended to correct abuses which have become serious only on account of the nineteenthcentury crowding of cities and growth of factory life.

From 1880 to 1883 Spencer finds eleven "socialist" acts of Parliament. They are for regulating advance notes on sailors' wages, for the safety of ships, compulsory education, excise, trade reports, electricity, public baths, lodgings, cheap trains, payment of wages, and further inspection of bake-houses.

Now compare these, one by one (to take our samples mostly from incidental mention in the same essays), with the press-gang law, which, up to the middle of this century, enslaved the sailor; with the fifteenth-century law which prohibited captains from setting out in the winter; with the law favouring education by "benefit of clergy"; laws fixing the price and quality of beer; prohibiting the export of gold; with the laws which, up to 1824, forbade the building of factories more than ten miles from the Royal Exchange; regulated the minimum time for which a journeyman might be retained and the number of sheep a tenant might keep; and, finally, those fixing the maximum wages of labourers and the size and price of the loaf. All these laws, of which the type is the fourteenth-century regime restricting diet as well as dress, aimed, like present laws, to correct what seemed to be abuses. They have all passed away, having failed to correct the "abuses."

How unreasonable, then, to pick out a few from over eighteen thousand laws to which New York subjects its citizens, and because, under conditions a hundred times more complicated than those of our ancestors, they restrain personal liberty in various respects or provide for State management, to say that we are advancing in the path of restriction!

The fact is that the growing pressure of misery, the growing perception that monopolies are infringements of the rights of the people and that wealth is unnaturally distributed, lead those who see no better remedy hesitatingly to apply ancient expedients for the cure of evils either new in themselves or newly perceived. Let us look at the truth, although one can only regret if even such socialism is not growing; because, if it were, it would be the first sign of that Berserker rage which is sure to follow upon a universal appreciation of the deep evil of our present social conditions. The real social advance is on broader lines.

There are three stages of moral regeneration: first, to understand that the present state of the world is hell,—that is, injustice; second, to realise that there is a kingdom of heaven,—that is, of justice; and, third, to believe that we can get there. After that comes the knowledge of the way. The desire to get the kingdom is of little value or effect unless it is based on something more than care for self, as distinguished from others.

The majority of men are at present satisfied with things as they are. If they were not, they would change them. But they do not in their hearts desire the coming of any other kingdom but their own, which would be no improvement on the "devil's." If they do not believe in a better state, they will not desire it; or, if they do not desire it, they will not believe in it.

It was not through accident nor through stupid materialism that we took one word "heaven " from the Anglo-Saxon "heafen" that which is lifted up. The higher place is ever the better, except for the lower man.

"A political Utopia would be a physical heaven, concealing a spiritual hell,—a monstrosity. Society cannot be prevented from the externalisation of its interior character by artificial arrangements of its exterior politically, nor be made to present scenes of justice and happiness, when the principle is not in the people."—Stephen ard Mary Maybell.

The rich think that they have about all the good there is, and, finding it a delusion, are discontent with God, and say that the universe is bad. The poor think that, gross as are the inequalities, they have a chance to get on top, and do not want a change until they despair of securing an advantageous place. All social reforms, except prohibition, unite in showing the evils of present economic conditions, in showing that there might be better and that we can get the better ones. So that all those reforms are, for the present, united in their real result.

Now, if, when the three stages are passed, we are to try socialism, we need not complain. It cannot be worse than our kakocracy. The great mass of people to-day have not, nor ever have had, the slightest confidence in freedom. Most persons know that our social system is robbery, but they think they share in the spoils. They think also that men must be restricted, prohibited, and circumscribed in some way, if they are to do right. To call anything "free " is to stamp it with opprobrium. "Free love," "free rum," "free trade," "free thought," even "free press" and "free speech" (though the counting-house and the police make these but names compared to what they ought to be) are regarded as paraphrases for "unbridled license and anarchy." Public schools are called "free schools" in England, and are in corresponding disrepute.

While all this is so to impose upon the people any system which involves freedom would be only to insure its being discredited in repute and perverted in practice by men who care nothing for liberty and who would at once cast about for a means of taking advantage under it. All that improved political conditions can do is to give men the opportunity of doing right, which they cannot have at present.

But the spirit of humanity,—man-liness, as we call it,—which is behind socialism, is increasing. It expresses itself, as it best can, according to its light; and, though we may think the method wrong, we can see that that is of little consequence. " In the warming heart of the world is the hope for social justice." All humane reforms aim at a voluntary co-operation; which is righteousness.

Stephen Pearl Andrews, Revisal of Kant's Categories

Stephen Pearl Andrews published one essay in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy. The July, 1874 issue contained his "Revisal of Kant's Categories," one of the most conventional philosophical essays we have from Andrews. Andrews, whose interest in linguistics eventually led him to work on Alwato, a "universal language," approaches Kant's categories through grammar. Though it is, in itself, a fairly straightforward essay, its broader context includes Andrews' Discoveries in Chinese (available from Elibron), the works on Universology (text scanning in progress), and, generally, the work by Charles Kraitsir, Alexander Bryan Johnson, Elizabeth Palmer Peabody, and others to discover a scientific, or pre-Babel, universal language.

Further reading: For Kraitsir, whose Boston academy numbered both Peabody and William B. Greene among its instructors, see The Significance of the Alphabet and Glossology. For page scans of Andrews' universological works, see The Primary Synopsis of Universology and Alwato and The Basic Outline of Universology: An Introduction to the Newly Discovered Science of the Universe. The Continental Monthly was host to two apparently-unfinished series of essays on universal language. Andrews contributed two articles—"A Universal Language" and "Language, A Type of the Universe"—and Edward B. Freeland contributed two installments of "The Scientific Universal Language: Its Character and Relation to Other Languages" (pts. 1 and 2).



The categories of quantity, quality, relation, and modality, as developed by Immanuel Kant in his Critique on Pure Reason, lie so directly at the basis of the entire fabric of modern speculative philosophy, that any work done, either to render the application of these fundamental discriminations of thought more extensive and lucid, or to remove any lurking error in the classification itself, could not be other. wise than important. I propose in this communication to attempt both of these objects.

In respect to the first, the better understanding of the categories themselves, and especially outside of or beyond the abstract metaphysical aspect of the subject, the carrying of them over from being merely categories of the understanding into some objective sphere, and proving them in that manner to be also categories of Universal Being, what I shall attempt is only what is greatly needed in respect to the whole domain of abstract and transcendental thinking. It is alike characteristic of the transcendental Metaphysicians and of the modern Positivists, or the school of external Scientists, that they have kept mutually so well asunder from each other. If the former have carried their abstract truths into the realm of objective science at all, it has been feebly, and only, as it were, for the purpose of illustration or defense; and, if the Positivist School of investigators have drawn upon the Metaphysicians, as, in fact, they often have, and largely, for the better statement of the laws which they are formulating in the realm of Nature, and indeed for the discovery of the laws themselves, it has been for the most part without credit and often quite unconsciously. It will be the work of the thinkers of the future to narrow and span this gulf which severs Philosophy from Science, and to demonstrate the identity of law in both spheres. The abstractions of transcendental logic must be carried forward and outward into the domain of Nature on the one hand; and the observations, investigations and reasonings of the objective scientists must and will more consciously, and in the end gladly, come into subordination to the governing influence of metaphysical, logical and transcendental thinking.

At the moment, I have in view, however, nothing more than to point out with, as I hope, some accuracy, the actual expression, correspondentially, of the Kantian categories in the main of ordinary school grammar—language, of which grammar is the mere presentative science, being, as it were, the middle ground between the metaphysical and the physical domain; so that what is here accomplished in respect to language, may, by an ulterior application of the same analogy, be carried forward into the outer world.

The three categories* of quantity are Unity, Manifoldness, and Universality, which are no more than the same ideas which in respect to grammar we indicate by the terms "singular," "plural," and "common." These discriminations are made to apply, in the first instance, to nouns and pronouns, which are the entical parts of speech; but they are carried over thence into a formal relation with the verb, and are again expressed, at least as to the singular and plural, in the forms of the verb as they occur in Sanscrit, Latin, Greek, and the other more complex languages; and, in some slight measure, in all languages which can be said to have any grammatical development.

The verb, when analyzed and stripped of its connection with participial forms, is reducible entirely to the single verb to be, predicating existence, or serving as copula (of being or existence), expressing itself in the coupling of the substance with the attributive idea. "I love," "I read," "I speak," signify merely, as is familiarly known, "I am loving," "I am reading," "I am speaking"; so that the true verbal part of every such expression resolves itself into the idea of being; hence it is that the verb, as the core of grammar, is, at the same time, the core of logic; and its subject-matter is being itself, separating into the "Seyn" and "Nicht-seyn" of Hegel, or into the Reality (otherwise, and better, termed Affirmation) and the Negation of Kant's categories of quality.

We are thus conducted to this second considerable group of the categories. The affirmative locution, as "I love," the negative locution, as "I do not love," and the interrogative locution with its double form, affirmative and negative, "do I love?" and "do I not love?" are the first distinctive and most important modifications of the verb, prior even to considerations of tense and mode, and so obvious, direct, and simple, that grammarians have overlooked them, and have not provided any technicality for the expression of theses peculiarities. So far as affirmation and negation are concerned, it is quite obvious that we are here again in exact accord with the Kantian discrimination in question. It is not quite so obvious, but equally true, that the interrogative locution involves what Kant intends abstractly by the term "limitation." Spencer says rightly, "All distinction is limitation." To discriminate in thought, as in any affirmation or negation from its opposite, is to insert mental limitation between them. Interrogation implies doubt, and dubitation is the discrimination and the holding in the balance before the mind of opposite propositions. "Do I love?' stands always in correlation with the opposite form, "do I not love?" The mind balances or wavers along the line of difference between the two ideas; and, in this manner, interrogation implies and corresponds with "limitation" as exactly as "Reality" with negation and ''Affirmation'' with negation.

We pass, in the next place, to the categories of relation. These forms are double. The first, which is inherence and substance (substantia et accidens, or, better here, accidens et substantia), is denoted in grammar by the adjective and the substantive in their mutual relation, the former as accessory to the latter. It needs only to be observed that the idea of adjectivity must, however, be so extended as to include the accidents, or case-relations, of the noun substantive; that to say, substantives in all other cases than in the nominative or vocative, which oblique cases are then denominated, in the technicalities of grammar, accidents, and are as really adjectives as the words to which the name is usually restricted. It should be further observed that this relation is static, or occurs in space merely, and, as such, it has a relation to the modes of the verb, as will be pointed out subsequently.

The next of these categories is that of causality and dependence (of cause or agency, and operation or effect). This has a similar relation to the tense of the verb which appears best when the verb is in the active voice. The "causality," cause, or agency, is then represented by the nominative which names the agent, and the "dependence" by the verb which names the operation. The relation here is what I denominate motic, and thence it has the same relation to time, and so to tense, as that which the preceding static relation holds to space, and thence to the mode of the verb. The relation of the tenses of the verb to time is universally recognized. That of the static relation of substance and accidents to modes of the verb is more obscure, but will be brought into some lucidity by the following considerations. The oblique cases of the noun, really, as we have seen, adjective in character, pass readily, by contraction and condensation, into the class of words called adverbs. "Rarely" means, for example, "at rare times"; "often," at "frequent times," &c. All adverbs may, in this manner, be reduced to oblique cases of nouns; and yet it is the function of adverbs not now to qualify substantives as static objects in space, but to qualify verbs as motic processes in time; and so preeminently it is the office of the adverb to modulate or modify the meaning of the verb—a function, therefore, the same in kind as that which, in the more general way, and with regard to certain modes that can be so indicated, is fulfilled by the so-called mode or mood of the verb itself. Mode is merely adverbiality wrought into the form of the verb. It is seen, therefore, that the verb—now meaning the compound verb, including the participle—denotes "the becoming" (Werden), and that the mode of the verb is the transfer to this motic aspect of being of the first double category of relation which belongs primarily to mere substantive and static form of being (Seyn).

The third and final one of this group of categories is reciprocal action (the interworking between objectivity and passivity). In this there is clearly nothing else than what we denominate the voice of the verb and its changing form from the active to the passive voice, with its double or reflected form in the middle, or reflected voice, and its quiet subsidence into indifference in the so-called neuter verb.

We come now, in time, to the categories of modality, is which we are simply to take up, ex professo, the consideration of that which has been previously alluded to, and partially provided for, as the modes or moods of the verb. The etymological identity of the names here, and throughout this exposition, is so striking and convincing that I have hardly deemed it necessary to advert to the subject, and nowhere more striking and convincing than in the case now before us. These are also double categories; and it is in respect to this group that I have the twofold undertaking in hand, first, to point out the grammatical analogies, and, in the second place; to establish certain important inaccuracies in the exposition of this class of discriminations as made by Kant himself; and I shall now couple these subjects with each other. The first of these categories is named by Kant that of possibility and impossibility. It will be seen, on slight reflection, that what is here meant is no more than bringing forward, in a new and special point of view, the same dubitation, now appearing as the potential mode of the verb which was previously expressed under the name of "limitation" and which appeared as the interrogative locution of the indicative mode. "I do not know whether I shall go or not," the last clause falling into what is denominated sometimes potential and sometimes subjunctive modality, is very closely related to the interrogatives, "shall I go?" or "shall I not go?" This intimate relationship is curiously and strikingly indicated in the Latin language by the force of the conjunction "an," which serves equally to introduce an interrogatory, or a clause involving this subjunctive dubitation.

But what is here said by Kant is by no means what is intended, or should be intended, by him. "Impossibility" is very far from being the true dubitative antithet of the term "possibility"; for nothing can be more certain not to happen than that which is impossible. What is meant, or should be meant, is not "what cannot be," but simply "what may not be"; or "may happen not to come to pass." The compound relation is not between "may be" and "may not be" in the sense of "must not be," but that between "may be" and "may happen not to be." The antithesis is expressed in the phrase "whether is" or "is not," or by the phrase "may be" and "may be not"; and not by the phrase "may be" and "may not be," meaning "must not be," as when in peremptorily forbidding an act one says "that thing may not be," which last is the form that involves the idea of impossibility; and this notion of impossibility belongs not under this category at all, but, as we shall see presently, under the subsequent and final one relating to necessity.

The second of this series of categories is that of "being or existence" (the Hegelian difference between Seyn and Da-seyn had not yet been insisted on) and "not-being or non-existence." Here again we have simply brought, in the performance of a new role, a category with which we are familiar under the name of reality, or affirmation and negation, and so close is the identity that there seems to be no other reason for the repetition than that affirmative and negative modality affect subjunctive and potential forms of thought in this case; whereas, under the categories of quality, it is the direct or indicative assertion or denial which is in question.

We come in the end to the third of this series of categories, which is stated by Kant as necessity and accidentality. But attention is now to be directed to the important fact that this also is a false antithesis. The real accidentality, as affecting the verb, is expressed in the affirmative and negative alternation. A thing may be or may not be, and occurrence or non-occurrence may be attributed to chance; whereas whatsoever is necessary is excluded from all connection with chance or accidentality. The true antithesis here, that which is meant, or should be meant, by this double category is affirmative necessity" and "negative necessity"—the necessity to be or the necessity not to be (or to not be), one of which is just as peremptory as the other. The antithesis placed before us by Kant is really between the third and the second of this series of categories and is not that which is intended. And now it will appear, on closer attention, that negative necessity is exactly that impossibility which Kant has erroneously placed as the antithet of possibility. The true expression of the category here, therefore, is "affirmative necessity," called rightly by Kant "necessity," and "negative necessity" synonymous with impossibility.

The three categories of modality, as amended in accordance with these suggestions, will therefore stand thus:

1. Possibility and possibility not (to be).
2. Affirmative form and negative form of possibility and possibility not.
3. Affirmative necessity (command, imperative mode) and negative necessity = impossibility (inhibition, prohibition, negative form of the imperative mode).

Or, expressed verbally in the forms of the verb—1. "May be" and "may be not." 2. "May be" and "may not be"; hypothetically "is" and "is not." 3. "Must be," "let it be," "be"; and "must not be," "let it not be," "be not."

But affirmative and negative necessity are not confined the imperative mode, or to the modal form of the verb. They glide in, in a very subtle manner, in connection with all native locutions in a way which is now to be pointed out. Positive necessity lurks in the compound alternative proposition, "either IS, or is NOT"; that is to say, it is all affirmative necessity by excluded middle that one or the other true. This predication may be made with positive certainty of everything, either that "it is" or "is not." The alternative involved is therefore affirmative necessity, and we are, as it were, commanded to bide by the one or the other proposition. On the contrary, negative necessity is involved in the similar logical inhibition, or negative command, not to affirm that thing "is and is not" (meaning to be understood in the same time and the same sense), for this involves the logical principle of contradiction. Either "is" or "is not" as an unavailable alternative is therefore an expression of affirmative necessity; and "not (i.e. don't say) is" and "is not" is a similar expression of negative necessity.

These considerations lead us to another important observation in close connection with logical accuracy and true definition, not so directly, however, involved in the subject of Kant's categories. I refer to a prevalent, if not indeed, as I believe, a universal inaccuracy in the use of the terms "positive" and "negative." Nothing is perhaps better established in the common idea, even with those most versed in critical discriminations, than that these two terms, positive and negative, are legitimately antithetical to each other, while yet this is not the case. The term truly antithetical to "negation" or "negative" is "affirmation" or "affirmative." "Affirmative" and "negative" make therefore the true coupling of terms in this sense. The true antithet of "positive " is, on contrary, "dubitative" or "doubtful." A negative proposition is just as positive as an affirmative one. We deny as positively as we affirm; and that which is unpositive or nonpositive is simply undecided or doubtful.

There remains much to be said, in this connection, of the relation of the objective case to Objectivity, of the dative case to Teleology, etc. But, to avoid making this communication too long, I omit these additional considerations—say merely, in general terms, that Grammar repeats Logic throughout in a sense which has not heretofore been clearly expounded, or, so far as I am aware of, even intimated.

* The categories, as in Seelye's translation of Schwegler's History of Philosophy, are as follows:

Quantity. Quality.
Totality, Reality.
Multiplicity, Negation.
Unity, Limitation.

Relation. Modality.
Substance and Inherence, Possibility and Impossibility.
Cause and Dependence, Being and Not-Being
Reciprocal Action, Necessity and Accidence

from The Journal of Speculative Philosophy. St. Louis: Jul 1874. Vol. 8, Iss. 3; p. 268